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Introduction 
 
Nowadays high profile merger cases  are becoming quite important and are taken as 
milestones of legal systems that produce the needed juridical backbone of the evolution of the 
market regulation. Additionally such cases are equally important for the progress of the 
economic theory in the domain of competition analysis and policies.  
This study will give outlook of the decisions made by the European Commission, as well 
as, the US Department of Justice in the merger case of two telecommunication corporations- 
WorldCom and MCI. This case was one of the most important cases that determined the future 
development of the telecommunication and Internet industry worldwide. The main point of the 
case analysis is to consider the competitive effects produced by such possible merger and the 
possible solutions in case of anticompetitive outcomes.  
The methodology used while writing the essay is based on two major parts: I) analytical 
part that takes most of the analyses and II) theoretical part. The first part is comprised of the 
analyses of the US Department of Justice and especially Federal Communications Commission 
that has the authority for such cases, as well as, the profound opinion and conclusions of the 
European Commission (DG Competition) of one questionable segment of the 
telecommunications market, the Internet market, that creates anticompetitive effects. The second 
part will give the predominant theoretical concepts used by the antitrust authorities. 
 
I. Analytical Part 
 
1. Federal Communications Commission / DoJ –United States of America 
 
 
The merger case between WorldCom and MCI was analyzed by Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC 98-225) and US Department of Justice (DoJ).They prepared 
document that contains the reasons and the possibilities for and against such merger. The study is 
made in the light of United States market dimensions, but also significant part is dedicated to the 
international dimension of the merger. 
 The basic feature of the applicant WorldCom on the US market is that it is one of the 
largest U.S. telecommunications companies (1997 revenues of $7.35 billion) and when added to 
that the vast international dimension of the company, the result is world prominent position of 
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the company. On the other hand, MCI is the second largest U.S. provider of long distance and 
international telecommunications services and also has high place on the domestic market.  
 
Markets 
Domestic Long Distance Services 
  
In order to be examined the competitive effects of the merger on the product market of   
domestic long distance services, they have to be defined. According to this study there are two 
product markets that need to be considered while concluding. The first one is residential 
customers and small business (mass market), that is comprised of telephone and similar 
communication services offered to the end users. The second market in question is medium-sized 
and large business customers (larger business market), that offers services for other companies in 
the American economy. 1 The geographic markets are local and national.  
The Commission determined more than 600 companies (1996) as market participants on 
the relevant market for domestic long distance services. But those that make the most of the 
market are seen through the classification of mass market or larger business market. In the light 
of the mass market the dominant market participants are AT&T with market share below 50% of 
the total market, fallowed by MCI, Sprint, LEC, GTE and Southern New England 
Telecommunications Corp. (SNET). The larger business market consists of mainly the same 
names AT&T, MCI, and Sprint which hold the predominant part of the market and WorldCom 
that has, as described, substantial part.2  
The analysis of competitive effects was conducted on the grounds of many instruments. 
They gave results confirm that there will be an increase in market concentration (HHI Index), but 
they also showed decent, acceptable numbers in terms of competition. In addition of the study, 
the industry market trends seen through the transmission capacity of the new networks, showed 
barriers to entry, but because of the future impact of the new technology on transmission 
capacity, the conclusions confirm future healthy competition. Furthermore, there is possibility of 
WorldCom to lose its characteristic of ‘maverick supplier’ on the wholesale market. As final 
                                                 
1
 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER, Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D.C. 
20554, September 14, 1998, p. 15-17 
Available at: http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/1998/fcc98225.pdf  
2
 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER, Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D.C. 
20554, September 14, 1998, p. 19-22 
Available at: http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/1998/fcc98225.pdf 
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conclusion it was estimated “that the merger likely will not impair competition in the domestic, 
interstate, inter-exchange market. We therefore decline to impose any of the various conditions 
proposed by commenters.”3  
 
U.S. International Services  
 
The U.S international services’ product market is determined by the transport capacities 
as its main characteristic. The transport makes available the international physical transmission, 
voice telephony and data traffic that flow through the optical cables. For that reason it is 
estimated that augmentation of international transport capacity as input of international 
telecommunications services will moderate “the increase in concentration and prevent any 
anticompetitive effects.”4 In addition, there are three regions as geographic markets: Atlantic, 
Pacific, and Caribbean/Latin America, which have to be taken in consideration. 
The market participants are distributed across the geographic regions. The most 
important is the Atlantic region, where the leading company in respect of telecommunication 
transports (submarine cables), is Global Crossing wit a market share about 40 percent fallowed 
by WorldCom (17.2%). As far as the MCI is concerned, the estimations indicate around 6.1 %, 
which brings the merger to significant market position on the Atlantic’s route. The Pacific region 
is the second most important region where the market is lead by AT&T's 12.1 %. As a 
comparison the merger companies on this route will have around 9.6 % together, which is rather 
moderate taken that the market is highly competitive. The last region that has been questioned is 
Caribbean/Latin American Region on which MCI/WorldCom combined will become second 
provider of services with around 12.1%, right behind Telecommunications Corp. (Batelco) that 
has 24.2%. 5  
At the end, there are final conclusions about the competitive effects of this merger on the 
market of U.S. International Services. On the mass market as well as on the larger business 
                                                 
3MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER, Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D.C. 20554, 
September 14, 1998, p. 46 
Available at: http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/1998/fcc98225.pdf  
4
 lbid., 47 
5
 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER, Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D.C. 
20554, September 14, 1998, p. 50-56 
Available at: http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/1998/fcc98225.pdf 
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market it was estimated that MCI/WorldCom ‘is not likely’ to have significant anticompetitive 
effect.6 
 
Local Exchange and Exchange Access Services  
 
 
The relevant product market for local exchange and exchange access services was split 
into mass market and larger business market. As far as the geographic market is being analyzed 
it is vital to stress that “the Commission found that each point-to-point market constituted a 
separate geographic market “7 defining the market as local, national and regional depending on 
the point-to-point description. 
Additionally, the market participants (AT&T, MCI, and Sprint) on the mass market, 
which is clearly competitive market, control irrelevant parts of the market. On the larger business 
market the situation is quite similar and the main competitors are WorldCom (never exceeding 6 
%, MCI) which is relatively small share and other national and local providers.  
 
In terms of analysis of competitive effects the findings show that on the mass market as 
well as on the larger business market “the merger of WorldCom and MCI … is unlikely to result 
in unilateral or coordinated anticompetitive effects.”8 
 
Internet Backbone Services  
 
The main element that was obstacle for competition and was extensively analyzed by the 
European Commission is the market for Internet Backbone Services. The product market is 
comprised of three key elements: end users, Internet service providers (ISPs), and Internet 
backbone providers (IBPs). The geographical distribution of the providers, in the study of the 
American Federal Communications Commission, is national and worldwide.  
 MCI as market participant has the lead place on this market, and is has both IBP and ISP, 
which means dominant position on the top-level Internet network and its functioning. Indeed, it 
is fallowed by WorldCom that has significant role on the domestic market owning three IBPs 
                                                 
6
 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER, Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D.C. 
20554, September 14, 1998, p. 57-66 
Available at: http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/1998/fcc98225.pdf  
7
 lbid., p.94 
8
 lbid., p.102 
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and majority part of a forth one. What is more it also controls a number of network access points 
(NAPs) where IBPs interconnect (MAE-East (Washington DC), MAE-West (San Jose), MAE-
Dallas, MAE-Los Angeles, and MAE-Chicago.)9 
 
Without a doubt, the most important consequence of this merger might be creation 
anticompetitive effects on the internet market, or more precisely the Internet backbone services 
which are considered to be the chief and predominant determinant of the quality and availability 
of Internet in general. Furthermore, such merger will eventually produce over time increased 
concentration of assets. Even more, the discussed settlements-free peering from IBPs, will surely 
be in future important barrier to entry. As a result of such findings MCI proposed a divesture.  
 
2. DG Competition – the European Commission  
 
1. Markets 
According to the European Commission on November the 9th 1997 two big American 
firms in the service industry, WorldCom and MCI, signed an agreement for merging into one 
company ”MCI/WorldCom”, which will be managed by WorldCom.10 WorldCom and MCI are 
telecommunications companies with main domain of operation - services, functioning on 
national and international level. The base of the firms is in the United States; however it has 
subsidies in many of the counties in the European Union.11 
 The important thing for the European Union, and for the unit in charge of mergers and 
competition policy DG Competition (European Commission), is to estimate the “community 
dimension” of the merger, meaning the impact of the fusion of these companies on the 
competition in the internal market, and to react appropriately according to the Merger Regulation 
in order to keep the markets in equilibrium. The estimated impact, according to the Merger 
Regulation, is determined as allocation of turnover on a geographical basis. The methodology 
used for determination of the future aspects of the contract, showed that WorldCom and MCI 
                                                 
9
 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER, Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D.C. 
20554, September 14, 1998, p. 79-80 
Available at: http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/1998/fcc98225.pdf 
10
 COMMISSION DECISION of 8 July 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common 
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement, (Case No IV/M.1069 - WorldCom/MCI), p.2 
Available at: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m1069_19980708_600_en.pdf  
11
 lbid., p.2 
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each have Community-wide turnover exceeding ECU 250 million. WorldCom and MCI do not 
have more than two-thirds of their Community-wide turnover in one, same Member State.12 
After verifying that DG Competition has authority over the case “within the meaning of Article 
3(1) (a) of the Merger Regulation”13, coordination and exchange of information has been 
established with the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice (DoJ). 14 
 
 There are two main features of the compatibility with the common market: the carrier 
services and the internet-related services. DG Competition’s testing is focused on the Internet as 
a main sphere of the study. The suppliers of the Internet services are called Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) “offering Internet access services on a commercial basis”.15 In order, the ISPs, 
to provide Internet on a wide level they have to interfere between each other and exchange 
information by interconnection, which can involve either peering or transit services. The 
structure of the Internet is very important for this case because, as seen later, it will bring the key 
arguments for the divesture proposed and realized by MCI. So, there are two core levels of the 
Internet structure: the top-level networks and secondary peering ISPs. The definition of the top-
level networks focuses the importance on the transit services’ functioning, which indicates 
limitation to the internet exchanging process: “Traffic which is progressively defaulted to higher 
level networks will finally end up in the hands of an ISP who has no one else to whom to turn, 
and must either assume responsibility on its own account for delivering the traffic across peering 
interfaces, or return it undelivered. These networks are referred to hereon as “top-level networks” 
or “top level ISPs”.16 
 
Market definition 
 
The product markets that have to be seen are as fallows: host to point of presence access 
services, internet access services, top level or universal Internet connectivity. The point of 
                                                 
12COMMISSION DECISION of 8 July 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common 
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement, (Case No IV/M.1069 - WorldCom/MCI), p.3 
Available at: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m1069_19980708_600_en.pdf  
13
 lbid.,p.2 
14
 lbid.,p.3 
15
 lbid.,p.6 
16
 COMMISSION DECISION of 8 July 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common 
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement, (Case No IV/M.1069 - WorldCom/MCI), p.3, point 41 
Available at: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m1069_19980708_600_en.pdf 
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presence services and their hosting (maintenance) are considered to have differentiated 
competition depending on levels of connection that varies form ISP level to low level. In 
addition, for the second category analyzed as a product market, the internet access services, the 
parties argued that these services can be easily substituted with other forms of data transmission 
service, but it does not appear to be such. The specificity of the Internet network is contained in 
the possibility to be reached by others, also connected on Internet, and the accent is given to the 
access to connection (barrier to entry), and thus exchange data and information. At the end, when 
explaining the third product market question rose is: weather “ISPs all compete against one 
another to provide the same connectivity services, or whether there are any distinct and narrower 
markets within the sector?”17 As a consequence, the responsible for the case at DG Competition 
while analyzing the relevant product markets came up with a final conclusion which states that 
“the relevant market on which the merging parties are active is the market for the provision of 
top level or ‘universal’ Internet connectivity”. 
 
However, there has been an ‘evolution of the market definition’ that pushes the study in 
another direction. “ The concept of ‘top level network’ might not represent today’s economic 
reality, insofar as some of the players apparently capable of functioning as top-level networks are 
in fact paying for some or all of their peering. Others may benefit from the peering agreements 
when no longer will be possible to enter/paid, and therefore their status as top-level networks 
may be open to question. As a result, the numbers of firms actually capable of offering 
competitive constraints may be smaller than the concept of ‘top-level networks’ might imply.18 
On the other hand, the rapid development of fiber optics and cable technology projects a way to 
the future for the smaller Internet providers to offer top level and universal Internet. But, here it 
must be said that today that is not the case, so that would mean that the process is in early stages 
and the market definition applied to this merger case is not to be changed, “but the fact that this 
is likely to happen should be borne in mind as a relevant factor when considering the market 
power of the parties.19 
                                                 
17
 COMMISSION DECISION of 8 July 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common 
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement, (Case No IV/M.1069 - WorldCom/MCI), p.15 
Available at: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m1069_19980708_600_en.pdf  
18
  lbid., p.17 
19
 COMMISSION DECISION of 8 July 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common 
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement, (Case No IV/M.1069 - WorldCom/MCI), p.17 
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In response, the parties argued that in case of price increase imposed by hypothetical 
monopolist, any ISP is capable to divert the internet traffic through consequent peering 
agreements enlarging the reach of its operation. In addition, they claimed that the ISPs ‘in 
trouble’ could tie contracts with other ISPs, and also that all of the operations will not reflect into 
unprofitable price increase by buying traffic.20 
 
Relevant geographic markets 
 
Assessing the relevant geographic markets DG Competition came up with three domains. 
The first market, corporate and traveler services is defined on national as well as at any other 
wider level, where as, the second, carrier services is at least regional, but also has international 
dimension. For the third one, Internet services, the geographic market depends of the level 
looked upon. So, it can be qualified as local, national, regional or worldwide.21  
 
Competitive assessment 
 
DG Competition focused on three relevant points while assessing the competitive effects 
of the merger. The points in question are: carrier services, Internet access services and top level 
or universal internet connectivity. The market for carrier services on European level (according 
to the parties) is controlled about 95% by European telephone operators. WorldCom has been 
trying to set networks in every big city, and MCI has no significant influence. On transatlantic 
level the company MCI/WorldCom would have around 23% of the US market. 22 As far as the 
Internet access services are concerned, the study shows that there is substantial competition at 
retail level and low barriers to entry. Furthermore, the most important market that needs to be 
seen deeper is top level or universal Internet connectivity. During the competitive assessment of 
top level or universal Internet connectivity were used a couple of techniques and methods in 
order to prove the dominant and unacceptable position of the company to be made after the 
merger. The data showed that in terms of the number of connections MCI /WorldCom would 
                                                                                                                                                              
Available at: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m1069_19980708_600_en.pdf  
20
 lbid., p.18 
21
 lbid., p.19-20 
22COMMISSION DECISION of 8 July 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common 
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement, (Case No IV/M.1069 - WorldCom/MCI), p.20 
Available at: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m1069_19980708_600_en.pdf  
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have around 55% to 68%. In addition, the estimations about possible revenue pointed out 45 -
55% of the market earnings to go to the newly formed company. The traffic flow was also 
analyzed with two methodologies. According to the methodology of a hypothetical monopoly 
MCI/WorldCom would have 75 -85% of the traffic flow. However the second methodology 
based on 12 networks gave rather moderate data, placing the MCI/WorldCom’s share around 42 
-52% of the total traffic flow.23 
 The Chief Operating Officer of WorldCom stated that” having a big network is a huge 
barrier to entry for competitors”24. Therefore, the conclusions are that “the combined network 
would be significantly larger than the size of its nearest competitor (Sprint), on either revenue or 
traffic flow, bearing in mind that the next competitor, the GTE group, is about half the size of 
Sprint.”25 
 
Impact of merger on competition 
 
 The impact of the merger on the competition in the domain of Internet is seen as 
anticompetitive. The authorities claimed that the amalgamation of leading Internet networks of 
WorldCom and MCI will produce a network that will have magnitude of behaving independently 
and thus will influence customers worldwide and in Europe. Reinforcement of the market 
position of the merged company (MCI/WorldCom) can be done by perusing different aggressive 
strategies and control the market imposing different peering agreements. Moreover, the company 
could influence the costs and the quality of the Internet services and also could be controlled the 
quality of the connector’s service (peering partner). The growth of MCI/WorldCom will bring 
possibility for this company to reduce the independence of incumbent competitors and behave 
independently of its customers. As a response the parties claimed that multi-homing can be used 
as an alternative. To that the Commission responded with the fact that there is competitive 
limitation. The possibility of potential competitors was considered and the conclusion is that the 
barriers to entry can be augmented easily for the competitors that want to enter at top-level 
network. As a result ‘the merger might well create a ‘snowball effect’ in that MCI WorldCom 
                                                 
23COMMISSION DECISION of 8 July 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common 
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement, (Case No IV/M.1069 - WorldCom/MCI), p.21 -26 
Available at: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m1069_19980708_600_en.pdf  
24
 libd., p.22 
25
 libd., p.26 
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would be better placed than any of its competitors to capture future growth through new 
customers”.26 Having this in mind, the customers might try to act against MCI/WorldCom and 
contradict, but unless their actions are united there will not be any pressure nor effect on making 
the situation more competitive.27 
 
3. MCI's Divestiture 
 
 
MCI proposed divesture that had to reduce or even eliminate the suspicions about the 
“competitive” crater of the merger.  Thus this meant that MCI by merging with WorldCom will 
lose the Internet business and will have to transfer number of contract to the newly formed 
company (NewCo – DG Competition or C&W – DoJ) that had to be inevitably sold to a 
‘purchaser’28 Furthermore, “NewCo will be an independent business with 100% of the Internet 
traffic and 100% of the Internet revenues of the iMCI Business.”29 
   
 During the transaction MCI had to transfer to C&W assets and employees (22 nodes ; 
over 15,000 interconnection ports; and all the routers, switches, and other equipment dedicated to 
the backbone… ), ISP customers (1,300 domestic and international ISP customers), as well as, 
retail customers (Internet service, web-hosting, managed firewall, and Real Broadcast Network 
services).30 
 After assessment of the undertakings promised by MCI, there was approval of the merger 
by DG Competition (European Commission), as well as, by US Department of Justice by 
authorization of the Federal Communications Commission. Afterwards final exchange of letters 
and decisions were executed. After the fulfilled divesture the merger has been “declared 
                                                 
26
 COMMISSION DECISION of 8 July 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common 
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement, (Case No IV/M.1069 - WorldCom/MCI), p.27-29 
Available at: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m1069_19980708_600_en.pdf  
27
 lbid., p.31 
28
 libd., p.32 
29
 lbid.,p.33 
30
 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER, Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D.C. 
20554, September 14, 1998, p. 84-90 
Available at: http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/1998/fcc98225.pdf 
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compatible with the common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement”31and that the 
merger will “will serve the public interest, interest, convenience, and necessity”.32 
 
II. Theoretical part 
 
1. The approach of the European Commission  
 
 The European Commission bases its approach on the Council Regulation (EEC) No 
4064/89 (amended by Regulation (EC) No 1310/97) of 21 December 198933 and decides to give 
a pass to the merger after fulfillment the needed divesture by MCI. In order to be identified the 
scope of the merger, it is used the definition of concentration within the scope of Article 3 of the 
same regulation which states that “a concentration shall be deemed to arise where: (a) two or 
more previously independent undertakings merge.”34 Consecutively to the finding that there is in 
fact a merger the Commission uses the Article 6 (1) (c) to determine that the concentration “falls 
within the scope of this Regulation and raises serious doubts as to its compatibility with the 
common market, it shall decide to initiate proceedings.”35 
  
The theoretical bases of the methodology of the European Commission were changed 
with the reform in 2004, when the test was changed into substantive ‘carbon test’.36 Until then 
                                                 
31
 COMMISSION DECISION of 8 July 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common 
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement, (Case No IV/M.1069 - WorldCom/MCI), p.45 
Available at: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m1069_19980708_600_en.pdf 
32
 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER, Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D.C. 
20554, September 14, 1998, p.127 
Available at: http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/1998/fcc98225.pdf 
33
 COMMISSION DECISION of 8 July 1998 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common 
market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement, (Case No IV/M.1069 - WorldCom/MCI), p.1 
Available at: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m1069_19980708_600_en.pdf 
34
 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 ,  21 December 1989, consolidated text “the merger regulation”, Article 3 
(1) (a) 
Available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/legislation/regulation/consolidated/en.pdf  
35
 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 ,  21 December 1989, consolidated text “the merger regulation”, Article 6 
(1) (c) 
Available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/legislation/regulation/consolidated/en.pdf  
36
 New Merger Regulation frequently asked questions 
Available at : 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/04/9&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN
&guiLanguage=en  
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the Commission, while solving the merger cases, was relying on “the concept of dominance: a 
merger must be blocked if it creates a dominant position, and therefore would likely result in 
higher prices, less choice and innovation.”37 This test was used in the case of the merger 
MCI/WorldCom. The economic analyses to explain the case uses the so-called ‘tacit collision 
effects or cooperative effects’, meaning that “the merging parties will be able to raise price even 
without the cooperation of rival firms. This corresponds broadly to the legal concept of single-
firm dominance.”38 This way of deciding was also known as theory of ‘concentrations with 
conglomerate nature’.  
 
2. The approach of the US. Federal Communications Commission/ DoJ 
 
The regulation about dominant position and abuse of a dominant position in the United 
States is regulated with two acts : Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 2 of the Clayton Act 
(1914) and added to that Robinson-Patman Act (1936) ( Europe - Art. 82 (ex. Art. 86) of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, meaning abuse of monopoly power).39 When determining the thresholds of 
dominance the antitrust policy in the United States the antitrust authorities are guided by the 
definition stating that monopoly is “power to exclude competitors”.40 The author agrees that the 
definition used by US is in fact close to the one used by the European authorities. However, 
when determining the dominance on the market the analyses must go beyond just the market 
shares and have to be seen other factors that might contribute to the possibility of raising prices 
by the concentration in question, whereas in Europe high market share is still considered to be 
enough for accusing of having dominance.  
  
                                                 
37
 New Merger Regulation frequently asked questions 
Available at : 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/04/9&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN
&guiLanguage=en 
38
 Competition Memo: November 1999 The Airtours case  
Available at: http://www.crai.com/ecp/assets/Airtours.pdf  
39
 Béatrice DUMONT and Peter HOLMES, Competition Policy and Market Regulation,  College of Europe, 
winter 2005-2006, (power point presentation), p.7-8  
40
 Kolasky William: What is competition? A comparison of U.S. and European perspectives - The Antitrust 
Bulletin, Spring-Summer 2004, p. 42 
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The Federal Communications Commission in the case of MCI/WorldCom, while 
determining the market power uses the “antitrust laws, including the DOJ and Federal Trade 
Commission 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines and the April 8, 1997.41 Indeed, the analytical 
framework for assessing competitive effects is relying on the “1992 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines suggest that market shares should be assigned to each firm currently participating in 
the market and then the pre-merger and post-merger levels of concentration should be calculated, 
using the Herfindahl - Hirschman Index (HHI).”42  
 However, here must be stressed that future projections of the development of the market 
must be taken in sight, because the picture which today’s market shares create about the 
competitive position of the concentration is not clearly to be kept in future – the company’s 
competitive importance might be understated or overstated.  
 
Conclusion  
 
  It is clear that the US authorities based their findings on a bit more different grounds 
then their European equivalents. Their approach examines predominantly the effects on the 
national market, with an attitude of reluctance towards the international dimension, although they 
recognize that what happens on the international market directly influences the positions of their 
companies on the regional and the domestic market. The main difference would be the 
methodology used, which on one hand is more econometric based, but on the other hand, the US 
authorities give much more weight on the future earnings and expectations of the development of 
the industry and different segmented markets within the analyzed industry. At the end they come 
up with more or less the same conclusion as the European Commission about the anticompetitive 
effects of the merger, so together they coordinated the implementation of the divesture proposed 
by MCI. 
 
 When one studies the used methodology and technique of the European Commission, one 
notices that the European authorities are little bit more vigilant. The possible reasons for acting 
                                                 
41
 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER, Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D.C. 
20554, September 14, 1998, p.11 
Available at: http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/1998/fcc98225.pdf 
42
 lbid., p12 
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that way might be many, but manly:  the tests, the economic and econometric analyses, 
unfinished or ever evolving institutional framework, etc. However, the most important is the 
approach used by DG Competition and that is the concept of dominance. The authorities are 
primarily concerned about the possible dominant position seen from ‘today’s perspective’, while 
determining the bottom line of the future developments as not quite secure. They recognize the 
importance of the future market solutions (in this case the rapid development of technology and 
most notably fiber optic cables), but they seem to be more bias to solutions like ‘snowball 
effect’. That is probably why there was serious need to be enforced a reform of the competition 
policy and merger regulation, that took place later on. 
 In conclusion it must be said that, both authorities did justify the merger and came up 
with more or less the same conclusions. Even though the used slightly different approaches, they 
both were first and foremost concerned about their own interests and areas of influence, so the 
merger was resolved with a favorable outcome for all major sides involved.   
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